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after all. For example, few now share the conviction of
Aquinas that only humans in creation are capable of
rationality or intelligence in its broadest sense. Even
fewer now share the enthusiasm of Descartes for the
view that animals are automata, mechanisms utterly
devoid of self-consciousness, and therefore incapable
of feeling pain. An unmistakable sense of caution in
this regard is registered by Robert Runcie, the Archbishop of Canterbury, in a recent lecture. "[B]oth in
theory and practice the boundaries of the human family
are becoming unclear," he argues. Behind practical
dilemmas,
My suuting point is a question: In what way, if at
all, are human beings unique in creation? In the past,
there have been almost too many answers to that question.
A whole range of unique and crucial differences has
been canvassed: humans alone have rationality, culture,
language; humans alone are persons, the possessors of
an immortal soul; humans alone are self-conscious and
are solely capable of sentient existence. Humans alone
are capable ofpraising God and entering into relationship
with the divine. There seems no end to the possibilities
of uniqueness which humans can contemplate for
themselves when they compare themselves to other
species. The notion of the image ofGod has furthered an
extensive uniqueness-searching anthropology which has
dominated Christian tradition for centuries, irritating one
distinguished Hebrew scholar, James Barr, into denying
that the notion of the image refers to anything tangible at
all, referring to such attempts as "the blood-out-of-a-stone
process."l
There are at least three reasons why theology should
be suspicious of this uniqueness-spotting tendency.
The first and most obvious is that a good number of
these differences have turned out to be not so unique

Summer 1990

there lies the theoretical difficulty of defining
what it is that decisively distinguishes the human
from the non-human - a difficulty that
increases as, for instance, naturalists detect in
non-human creatures subtleties ofbehaviour and
complexities of communication which, until
recently, would have been thought unique and
exclusive of humans. 2
Then there may be a question as to why humans find
it necessary to place themselves in a distinct category
from animals. One of the conclusions of Desmond
Morris' popular book, ~ ~ Am;., which aroused
most Christian commentators to complain, was his
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The truth they strove to bring home was that
the world God has given to his creatures, the
one world which they have to share, is in fact a
different world to.each one of them, but that the
world each creature knows is equally true. We
human beings, superior as we are, ought to be
very humble because other creatures have other
truths which we can only dimly grasp, worlds
we can never fully enter.

insistence that our desire to be placed above the animals
was itself a sign of insecurity. "Unfortunately, because
we are so powerful and so successful when compared
with other animals, we fmd the contemplation of our
humble origins somehow offensive, so that I do not expect
to be thanked for what I have done," he wrote.
Our climb to the top has been a get-rich-quick
story, and, like all nouveaux riches, we are very
sensitive about our background. We are also in
constant danger of betraying it3

He concludes with this question:
And if this is so with regard to an ox or an ant,
not to say a tree or a stone, how can we hope to
comprehend the God who comprehends them
all, to whom all worlds and truths are fully
known because he made them? 7

To these suspicions needs to beadded a third, namely
that the distinctions we have drawn have been frequently
and transparently self-serving, even selfish. Forexample,
it seems to be altogether too convenient for Aristotle to take simply one example - to suppose that since
"nature makes nothing without some end in view," it
must follow that nature has made all animals "for the
sake of man.'''' It has been so easy to turn this appeal to
the purpose of nature, and in subsequent Christian
centuries to "divine purpose," into a justification for
doing what we like to animals that we have come to
suspect the opposite is the true sequence. Aquinas,
following Aristotle, appeals both to the order of nature
and also to divine providence to assure us that "it is not
wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or
in any other way whatever."s The difference-finding
tendency in Western tradition has undoubtedly served
to minimize the moral standing of nonhuman creatures
and to enable us to exploit them with a clear conscience.
One cannot be but bemused by the reference in the
to ''brute
marriage service of the Book QfCommon
beasts that hath no understanding," since some, perhaps
many, higher mammals seem to know more about
monogamous relationships than at least some members
of homo sapiens.6 In short: much of our uniquenessspotting within the Christian tradition has been linked
directly or indirectly to the fostering of a low view of
animality, the traces of which are still found in our
language about "brutes", "beasts," and "bestial"; even
the word "animal" has become a libel- and not just on
human beings.
In a little but significant book oftheological fantasy,
entitled Travels in Oudamovia, John Austin Baker
describes the traveller's reaction to Oudamovian life and
worship, which was characterized by a friendly nonexploitive relationship with animals:

This interesting question leads me again to my
starting point Let me now frame the question in this
way. Is it possible to have a theological understanding of
humans as unique which avoids the suspicions and
dangers of self-service, insecurity, and moral denigration
of what is different - not to mention a view which
might broadly be reconcilable with empirical evidence?
IT

I begin this second section by laying some stress on
this word "theological." For it seems that many of the
previous claims for human uniqueness have been
essentially naturalistic rather than theological. I mean by
this that they have appealed to certain abilities, qualities,
or capacities, such as rationality, or power, or selfconsciousness, which are taken as determinative of what
is uniquely human. Such attempts I want to suggest are
not theological in the strict sense of being things which
are grounded in the nature of God itself. Despite the
traveller in Oudamovia's not wholly unjust complaint
that "our understanding of God is even less adequate
than our understanding of the life of our cat"8, it is here
that there may be a way forward.
If we take the gospel narratives seriously, it may be
that there is at least one thing we can know. It seems
appropriate to describe this truth in the form ofa story. It
is from Helen Waddell's Peter Abelard. Peter, you may
recall, had been made to suffer a terrible injustice from
people who had taken the law into their own hands. In
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will. But what would have been the use? All
this,' he stroked the limp body, 'is because of
us. But all the time God suffers. More than
we do.'
Abelard looked at him, perplexed.
'Thibault. when did you think of all this?'
Thimult's foce stiffened. 'It was that night,'
he said, his voice strangled. 'The things we did
to poor Guibert He - ' Thimult stopped. 'I
could not sleep for nights and nights. And then
I saw that God suffered too. And I thought that
I would like to be a priest. '
'Thibault. do you mean Calvary?'
Thibault shook his head. 'That was only a
piece of it - the piece that we saw - in time.
Like that' He JX>inted to a fallen tree beside
him, sawn through the middle. 'That dark ring
there, it goes up and down the whole length
of the tree. But you only see where it is cut
across. That is what Christ's life was; the bit
of God that we saw. And we think God is like
that. because Christ was like that. kind and
forgiving sins and healing people. We think
God is like that for ever, because it happened
once with Christ But not the pain. Not the
agony at the last We think that stopped.'
Abelard looked at him, the blunt nose
and the wide mouth, the honest troubled eyes.
He could have knelt before him. 'Then,
Thibault.' he said slowly, 'you think that all
this,' he looked down at the quiet little body
in his arms, 'all the pain of the world was
Christ's cross?'
'God's cross,' said Thibault. 'And it
goes on.'
'The Patripassian heresy,' muttered
Abelard mechanically. 'But. 0 God, if it were
bUe. Thibault. it must be. At least, there is
something at the back of it that is bUe. And if
we could fmd it - it would bring back the
whole world. '9

this passage, Peter is walking close to a wood with his
friend, Thibault.
'My God,' said Thibault. 'what's that?'
From somewhere near them in the woods
a cry had arisen, a thin cry, of such intolerable
anguish that Abelard turned dizzy on his feet,
and caught at the wall.
'It's a child's voice,' he said. '0 God, are
they at a child?'
'A rabbit.' said Thibault. He listened.
'There's nothing worrying it It'll be in a trap.
Hugh told me he was putting them down.
Christ!' The scream came yet again.
Abelard was beside him, and the two
plunged down by the bank... '0 God', [Abelard]
was muttering. 'Let it die. Let it die quickly. '
But the cry came yet again. On the right,
this time. He plunged through the thicket
of hornbeam.
'Watch out,' said Thibault, thrusting past
him. 'The trap might take the hand off you.'
The rabbit stopped shrieking when they
stooped over, either from exhaustion, or in some
last extremity of fear. Thibault held the teeth of
the trap apart, and Abelard gathered up the little
creature in his hands. It lay for a moment
breathing quickly, then in some blind
recognition of the kindness that it met at the
last, the small head thrust and nestled against
his arm, and it died.
It was the last confiding thrust that broke
Abelard's heart He looked down at the little
draggled body, his mouth shaking. 'Thibault,'
he said, 'do you think there is a God at all?
Whatever has come to me, I earned it But
what did this one do?'
Thibault nodded.
'I know,' he said. 'Only - I think God is
in it too.'
Abelard looked up sharply.
'In it? Do you mean that it makes Him
suffer, the way it does us?'
Again Thibault nodded.
'Then why doesn't He stop it?'
'I don't know,' said Thibault. 'Unlessunless it's like the Prodigal Son. I suppose the
father could have kept him at home against his
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The JX>int then so ably narrated by Waddell is this:
God suffers. I shall not be concerned here with the
precise theories about how God may be thought to suffer.
Notwithstanding Abelard's "mechanical" description of
this view as "the Patripassian heresy," it seems to me that
there are a variety of ways in which we can understand
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God as suffering presence in the world that do not lose
sight of divine omnipotence or indeed divine
transcendence. Even so gospel-rentred a scholar as Tom
Torrance can be so nervous about an outright declaration of divine passibility that he resolves the problem by
simply affirming the contradiction: God "redeems our
passability in his impassability."10 But I want to leave
that debate to one side, and suggest that the insight derived
from God's self-definition in Jesus Christ leads
inescapably to the view that God really and truly enters
into suffering. This seems to me to be required by a fully
incarnational theology in which God actually does what
is claimed - namely enter into the awfulness of the
human condition.
But like Thibault in the story, I want to go further. If
it is true that God is the Creator and sustainer of the
whole world of life, then it is inconceivable that God is
not also a co-sufferer in the world ofnonhuman creatures
as well. Years of Christian tradition has obscured this
basic implication of the gospel narrative for at least two
reasons. The first is because the scholastic tradition in
particular has denied to animals any moral standing, so
that even if they did suffer, such suffering was notregarded
as morally significant The second, and more obvious
reason, is that later Christian tradition, especially manifest
in Cartesianism, simply denied that animals could feel
pain at all. Even in this century notable theologians,
such as Charles Raven, argued not just that animals did
not suffer like humans but rather doubted that they
suffered at all. 11
And yet the idea that God is affected by the suffering
of all creatures has not been lost on generations of saints
and poets. "Here I saw the great unity between Christ
and us:' writes Julian of Norwich, "for when he was in
pain, all creatures able to suffer pain suffered with him. "12
It is written of Margery Kempe that "[w]hen she saw a
CruCifIX, or if she saw a man had a wound, or a beast, or
if a man beat a child before her, or smote a horse or
another beast with a whip, she thought she saw Our Lord
beaten and wounded."13 In this Julian and Kempe may
have something in common with Cardinal Newman:
"Think of your feelings at cruelty practiced upon brute
animals,' writes Newman, "and you will gain the sort of
feeling which the history of Christ's Cross and Passion
ought to excite within yoU."14
Perhaps the best known expression of this idea in
poetry is found in Joseph Plunkett's I ~ ~ ~

I see His blood upon the rose
And in the stars the glory of His eyes,
His body gleams amid eternal snows,
His tears fall from the skies.
I see His face in every flower,
The thunder and the singing of the birds
Are but His voice - and carven by His power
Rocks are His written words.
All pathways by His feet are worn,
His strong heart stirs the ever-beating sea,
His crown is twinned with every thorn,
His cross is every tree. 1S
More satisfactory I think is Edith Sitwell's Still Falls
in which she pictures Christ's redeeming blood
- like rain - continuing to fall on the wounds of the
suffering world.

~&lin.

He bears in his Heart all wounds, - those of
the light that died,
The last faint spark
In the self-murdered heart, the wounds of the
sad uncomprehending dark,
The wounds of the baited bear, The blind and weeping bear whom the
keepers beat
On his helpless flesh. . .the tears of the
hunted hare.
Still falls in RainThen - 0 I leape up to my God: who pulles
medouneSee, see where Christ's blood strearnes in the
frrmament:
It flows from the Brow we nailed upon the tree
Deep to the dying, to the thirsting heart
That holds the fires of the world, dark smirched
with pain
At Caesar's laurel crown.
Then sounds the voice ofone who like the heart
of man
Was once a child who among beasts was lain •Still do I love, still shed my innocent light, my
Blood, for thee.' 16
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This imaginative picture of Christ suffering all
pain and violence in the universe that God has made
conveys - it seems to me - a truth which has simply
eluded the fonnal theorists and dogmaticians of the
Christian tradition. Only very faintly, if at all, has the
church allowed this truth to be expressed in its liturgy.
For example, in the Byzantine rite for Holy Saturday it
is held that "[t]he whole creation has altered by thy
Passion; for all things suffered with thee, knowing 0
Lord, that thou holdest all things in unity." 17 But this
splendid example, I fear, is one of the comparatively few
exceptions to an otherwise almost wholly monolithic
anthropocentrisrn of East and West
It seems to me that the recognition that suffering
exists in the nonhuman world requires us to grapple with
the problem ofredemption for these spheres as well. If it
is believed, in fidelity to the gospel story, that God truly
enters into creaturely suffering, then there can be no good
reason for excluding God's suffering presence from the
realm of the nonhuman creation as well. Indeed, quite
the reverse. For the issue is not how much suffering or to
what degree any being suffers, but that it suffers at all
which is the underlying fact to be wrestled with. If as
Bonhoeffer once remarked, "only a suffering God can
help," it must follow that where there is suffering - no
matter whatever the kind and to what degree - God
suffers too.

I now turn to my third section. You may recall
Thibault's reaction to the question of suffering. Not
only did he hold that God suffered in all suffering
creatures, but also, reflecting upon that suffering in
both humans and animals, he had decided to become
a priest "And then lsaw that God suffered too," he said.
"And I thought I would like to be a priest" At first sight
this might appear to be a rather unusual reaction. It has
to be said that many prevailing notions of priesthood
would fmd the relationship, if any, hard to fathom. Yet
it seems to me that 'Thibaultian theology" (if I may
describe it so) is altogether coherent For if Christian
priesthood derives its authority from Christ, as the
focus of God's own self-definition, then it should
also follow that priesthood is an extension of the
suffering, and therefore also redeeming, activity of God
in our world.
The one point I want to make here is this: The wider
defmition of God's presence, and therefore also his
redeeming power, necessitates in turn a wider definition
of priesthood. I am by no means the first person to
think of priesthood in wider, we might say ecological,
tenns. Alexander Pope in his "Essay on Man" describes
the divine commission to have dominion and to look
after the world in tenns of Christian priesthood:
The state of Nature was the reign of God. ..

Man walked with beast, jointtenant of the shade;
The same his table and the same his bed;

No murder cloth'd him, and no murder fed...
Unbrib'd, unbloody, stood the blameless priest:
Heaven's attribute was Universal Care,
And Man's prerogative to rule, but Spare.18
One of the fll'St to use the phrase "the World's High
Priest" was Archbishop Leighton in the seventeenth
century. He spoke of the priest in the Psalmist's sense of
offering the praises of all creatures to their God:
All things indeed declare and speak His
glory: the Heavens send it forth, and the Earth
and Sea resound and echo it back. But His
reasonable creatures hath He peculiarly framed
both to take notice of His glory in all the rest,
and to return it from and for all the rest in a
more express and lively way.
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yourselves, which you have in Christ Jesus, who, though
he was in the form of God, did not count equality with
God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself taking
the form of a servant''23 It is this conception of the
omnipotence of God expressed in service which
constitutes the decisive paradigm of how we should
exercise our lordship or dominion over the nonhuman
creation. If it is true that the power of God is most
authentically expressed in the form of suffering service,
then we have to ask ourselves radical questions about
how we are to understand our own lordship or dominion
over nature in general and animals in particular. If we
are to have among us the mind of the one whose power is
expressed in humility, in condescension, in reaching
out to the least of all, has not our own relationship
to the suffering nonhuman got to undergo a fundamental
re-examination? Almost alone among contemporary
theologians, Torrance articulates the connection
between the suffering world and the human world
of priestly redemption. Torrance holds to a high view
of humanity:

And in this lower world it is Man alone
that is made capable of observing the Glory of
God, and of offering Him praises. He
expresses it well who calls man "the World's
High Priest."19
Such thoughts are similar to those expressed by
Coleridge, who in his poem ''To Nature" anticipates some
of the lyricism, if not the actual lyrics, of Teilhard de
Chardin's "Mass Upon the Altar of the World.''20
It may indeed be phantasy when I
Essay to draw from all created things
Deep, heartfelt, inward joy that closely clings:
And trace in leaves and flowers that round
me lie
Lessons of love and earnest piety.
So let it be; and if the wide world rings
In mock of this belief, to me it brings
Nor fear, nor grief, nor vain perplexity.
So will I build my altar in the fields,
And the blue sky my fretted dome shall be,
And the sweet fragrance that the wild
flower yields
Shall be the incense I will yield to Thee,
Thee only God! and Thou shalt not despise
Even me, the priest of this poor sacrifice.21

From the perspective oftheology, man is clearly
made the focus point in the interrelations
between God and the universe. He is given a
special place within creation with a ruling and a
priestly function to perform toward the rest of
created reality. AIl lines ofrationality and order,
of purpose and fulfillment in the creation
converge on him as man of God and man of
science and depend upon his destiny.

This notion ofsacrifice is taken up by George Herbert
in perhaps the best-known lines of all on this theme:

Man is the world's High Priest he doth present
The sacrifice for all; while they below
Unto the service mutter an assent,
Such as springs use that fall, and winds
that blow.22

But unlike others, Torrance does not stop here with the
familiar theme of theological self-congratulation. He
couples his high view of humanity with a strong view of
human responsibility:
this priestly role of man must take on a
redemptive form - that is how we should view
man's relationship to nature. It is his task to
save the natural order through remedial and
integrative activity, bringing back order where
there is disorder and restoring peace where there
is disharmony.24

Already we see the two familiar themes ofChristian
priesthood expressing themselves: the priest is the one
who "present(s)" or represents, and also the one who
offers up "the sacrifice for all." But what does it mean to
exercise a representative and sacrificial priesthood for
the whole created order? Who is representing whom,
and who is sacrificing what?
First, I want to suggest that the priest is the icon of
Christ The priest is to present and represent the love of
God focused in Jesus Christ "Have this mind among
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In short: the representative function of priesthood is the
presentation and actualization of God's suffering service
in the world.
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"For the creation waits with eager longing for the
revealing of the sons of God," writes St Paul, "because
the creation itself will be set free...and obtain the glorious
liberty of the children of God.''29 What does it mean for
humans to exercise a priestly role of redemption? Quite
simply: it concerns the releasing ofcreation from futility,
from suffering and pain and worthlessness. This, I want
to suggest. is the divine wade of redemption to which
humans are called by the power of the Spirit It is the
liberation of creation itself from decay and suffering perltaps in some ways the most fundamental liberation
of all. Such a perspective challenges at root the notion
that human responsibility in the world extends only to
serving and protecting our own species. Keith Ward's
paraphrase of Genesis 1, namely that "man" is made a
"god" in creation and that creatures "should serve him"
needs rethinking. 30 I suggest it should be that humans
given lordship or God-like power should serve creation.
To reiterate: The inner logic of Christ's lordship is the
sacrifice of the higher for the lower; not the reverse. If
the humility of God is costly and essential, why should
ours be less so?
Strangely enough it is Nietzsche who in a most
uncharacteristic piece of writing seems to point in my
direction. ''The deeper minds of all ages have had pity
for animals," he writes, "because they suffer from life
and have not the power to turn the sting of their suffering
against themselves, and understand their being
metaphysically.''31 According to Nietzsche, nature needs
the philosopher and the artist "to strive thereby for the
completion ofnature." But nature, according to Nietzsche,
needs - not only the artist and the philosopher - but
also the saint

Second, I want to suggest that Christ-like priesthood is necessarily socrificial. But what or whom is to
be sacrificed? Archbishop Leighton, and others before
and after him, have understood this sacrificial work in
terms of the offering of thanksgiving. "[I]n this lower
world," writes Leighton, "it is Man alone that is made
capable of observing the glory of God, and ofoffering
him praises." John Zizioulas, in a recent lecture, develops
the point further when he describes the priest as the one
who "refers the world back to [its] Creator."lS Now, I
do not want to deny that the offering of thanksgiving,
even on behalf of other creatures, is an important aspect
of priesthood - though I would have to say that it is
not clear to me that other creatures do not praise and
commune with their Creator in their own way. But leaving
that question aside, it seems insufficient to allow
thanksgiving as the sole or major definition of what the
priest has to offer.
Neither do I think that the sacriftcial aspect of
priesthood is adequately or properly characterized in
terms of sacrificing other forms of life such as animals.
"The killing of animals," writes Karl Barth, "when
performed with the permission of God and by His
command, is a priestly act of eschatological character."26
But whatever may be the meaning and historical
significance of the forms of animal sacrifice in the
Old Testament - and about this I recognize that there is
no little discussion27 it seems to me very difficult
indeed to reconcile the spirit of Christ-like sacrifice
with animal sacrifice, and for two reasons. The first is
that Christian sacrifice is primarily to do with the
offering of life and especially love - rather than blood
(although Good Friday is real enough), and second,
the internal logic of Christ's sacriftce is the sacrifice
of the higher for the lower and not the reverse. It does
not seem irrelevant to point out here that Jesus did not
sacrifice animals and, arguably, by his cleansing of the
Temple indicates more than an ambivalent relationship
to this practice.28
But the central point I want to make here is this: The
priestly work of sacrifice is best characterized by the
offering of self-costly love as exemplified by Christ
himself. To make this point clearer, I want to draw on
another New Testament image, this time not that of
Christ as the suffering servant in Phillippians but,
rather, the image of the world in a state of child-birth
in Romans. The creation groans in travail because it is
subject not by its own will to "bondage and decay."

Summer 1990

In him the ego is melted away, and the suffering
of his life is, practically, no longer felt as
individual, but as the spring of the deepest
sympathy and intimacy with all living
creatures...the attainment. at length, of the high
state of man after which all nature is striving,
that she may be delivered from herself. 32
And it is concretely in the lives of many saints that
we see prefigured this vision of the higher state of nature
to which Nietzsche refers. Of the many examples one
could give I choose simply one example from St Isaac
the Syrian: "What is a charitable heart?" he asks, and
replies as follows:
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It is a heart which is burning with love for the
whole creation, for men, for the birds, for the
beasts, for the demons - for all creatures. He
who has such a heart cannot see or call to mind
a creature without his eyes being filled with
tears by reason of the immense compassion
which seizes his heart; a heart which is softened
and can no longer bear to see or learn from
others of any suffering, even the smallest pain
being inflicted upon a creature. That is why
such a man never ceases to pray for the
animals.... He will pray even for the reptiles,
moved by the infInite pity which reigns in the
hearts of those who are becoming united
with God.33

in the world. And third, a shift away from the idea
that the characteristics of priesthood - namely
representation and sacrifIce - can be detailed in a
wholly human-centred way without involving the
exercise of Christ-like power and service to the whole
of creation.
The answer I want to give then to my opening
question is this: The uniqueness of humanity consists in
its ability to become the servant species, to exercise its
full humanity as co-participants and co-workers with
God in the redemption ofthe world. This view challenges
the traditional notions that the world was made simply
for human use or pleasure, that its purpose consists in
serving the human species, or that the world exists
largely in an instrumentalist relationship to human
beings. Only the most tenacious holding on to the
passibility of God may be sufficient to redeem us from
our own profoundly arrogant humanistic conceptions of
our place in the universe.
It is important, however, to spell out the implications
of the doctrine of priestly service which I have espoused.
The first is that humanity can have no right to regard
sentient creatures especially as simply means to their
ends. Animals are not simply here for our use, and to use
animals at all incurs a very great responsibility. I agree
with the principle commended by Stephen R. L. Clark
that it is wrong to be the cause of avoidable injury. But I
would, perhaps, go further. To make animals suffer for
human purposes is not just morally wrong, it is an act of
the gravest faithlessness. Humphry Primatt, who wrote
the most impressive theological treatise on animals, got
it right when he wrote that:

This last sentence goes some way to encapsulate the
point I want to stress: It is not just that sensitivity to
suffering is, or should be, a characteristic of priesthood
or saintliness, though I think it should be. It is rather
that sensitivity to suffering (and with it compassion,
empathy, mercy, loving forgiveness) are the hallmarks
of priesthood itself. Only when we can say that we
too have entered - however fleetingly - into the
suffering ofChrist in the suffering ofall creatures can we
claim to have entered into the priestly nature of our
humanity. More even than that, for the goal of our
priestly humanity as I see it is not, as St Isaac reminds
us, simply passive. We are to be active in prayer and
deed to ensure that we reflect not just Christ-like feeling
for the suffering of the world but also Christ-like healing.
We are not called to be mere spectators of the world of
suffering but active co-participants with God the Holy
Spirit in its redemption.

We may pretend to what religion we please; but
cruelty is atheism. We may make our boast of
Christianity, but cruelty is infidelity. We may
trust to our orthodoxy, but cruelty is the worst
of heresies. 34

IV
I turn now to my fourth section. My starting point
was the question: In what way, if any, are humans unique
in the creation God has made? The argument I have
sketched has been as follows: We need three shifts in our
thinking. First, away from the idea that if God suffers at
all, this suffering takes place solely within the human
species, to the view that God suffers in all suffering
creatures. Second, a shift away from a narrow
conception of priesthood as largely or exclusively
concerned with God and humanity - to the view that
priesthood is a participation in God's redeeming presence
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'That we now as a matter ofcourse use sentientbeings
in ways that cause them harm and suffering as laboratory
tools, as units of production in farming, as objects of
sport and entertainment, is a sign that we have lost not
just a sense of our priestly humanity but a sufficient
conception of the generosity of God revealed in Jesus
Christ All this is not to deny that we - indeed all nature
- is caught up in the structures of disorder of which
Torrance speaks.35 Neither is it to deny - in my favourite
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weaken concern for the healing of suffering humanity.
Nevertheless, it is no longer clear to me that we can
make an absolute distinction between one kind of
suffering and another, either that of a member of another
class, race, sex or - I would add - species. Neither is it
clear to me that we can in each and every situation claim
that human suffering is more important than any other
kind of suffering. Indeed, I want to suggest that the
attempt to place human well-being in a special and
absolute category of its own is one of the reasons why
other earthly creatures - indeed, the earth itself remains in a desperate state of travail, a travail so great
that its destruction - in part. if not as a whole - seems
inevitable. In other words, exclusive moral preoccupation with our own species is part of the problem itself
rather than its solution. We should face the fact that
years of Christian anthropocentricity (of a bad sort) has
helped lead us to the environmental crisis we now
encounter. In short, we have to redress the balance and
appreciate that humans are not just linked to nature, we are
part of nature.

line from Albert Schweitzer - that a clean conscience is
a figment of the imagination or as he actually puts it "an
invention of the devil. ''36 Neither is it to suppose that we
can easily tum to live in some Edenite hannony with
other creatures. I accept that we are compromised and
that we have difficult choices to make.
Nevertheless, I want to suggest that it is here we
may sense the possibility of living other than we do,
that we should reflect upon the fact that Christian
priesthood is sacrificial, costly priesthood. It cannot be
sufficient merely to have a negative vision of what we
should do to prevent suffering in the world. We need
positive vision of how we can take upon ourselves the
suffering of the world and transform it by the power of
the Holy Spirit. We need to experiment in ways of
liberation rather than always assuming that human
interest, narrowly conceived, always comes frrst To
give but one controversial example: It may be that the
truly Christian view of the morality of experimentation
begins not by asking how much suffering we can
legitimately inflict upon animals but rather should we
not elect to bear for ourselves whatever ills may flow
from not experimenting upon animals rather than using
our power to exploit the weak in our own favour. All
this has an urgency which in previous generations we
failed to appreciate. For our ruthless, un-gentle treatment
of the natural world has ushered in a cognizance ofcertain
limits to exploitation. Extinct species, like dead nature
itself, can no longer be exploited. It seems to me that
Christians have an opportunity in the present circumstances to show what it means to live as though we believe
in a generous loving God by living that generosity towards
nonhuman creatures.

Behind these eyes
lies the dlwn of lime.
You mike me I monster
or I Joke.
Lock me up so you un sure Ind Ilu,h.
I look blck with ,relt Sldness
for I know your PISt
Ind I see your destiny.
I do not hlte you.
I 1m ,entle; I 1m 10YII.
I blVe strenGth
beyond this ,llnt's body.
I 1m stronG in spirit.
My solemn laze revells the truth.
When you murder me
you Ire killin, you.
When you imprison my soul
you destroy your future.

v
I now turn to my fifth, and final, section and briefly
consider four objections to my argument
The first queries my whole train of argument by
suggesting that I have simply overlooked the powerful
"humans come first" tradition within Christianity.
According to the Linzey view, it is claimed, we shall end
up being more concerned about suffering hens than
suffering humans.
I agree with this objection if it means that the
suffering of humans - as well as the suffering of nonhumans - should be the subject of the serving and
sacrificial priesthood. Nothing in my argument should
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one and the same time. The best, perhaps the only, model
we can have is that of the incarnation itself. For if it is
possible for God in Christ to enter into the suffering of
the world, and yet transform that suffering into joy, why
should this capacity be limited in time and space to one
event only? I posit that Thibault was right What is seen
in Christ is one instance of the perpetual transfonoation
of suffering happening throughout time.
The fourth objection holds - perhaps on a lighter
note - that if we take the view that the higher should
have a greater concern for the lower, we shall end up
having as much - if not more - concern for asparagus
or cabbage or carrots than for human beings.
I do not think so. For the stress in my argument has
been on suffering creation. Despite popular notions of
talking plants and sentient vegetables, there is actually
no evidence that such creatures experience pain. Though,
of course, there may be some areas of difficulty and
doubt, I can see no good reason why these should prevent
us from behaving in a priestly manner to those beings
whose capacity for suffering is beyond reasonable doubt.
That we may, however, discover sensitivity and sentience
outside the human species - in what are to us unlikely
place - only reinforces the fact that God has created an
amazingly sensitive and delicate world and that wherever
we go we should tread gently.
It is important, however, that my argument from
suffering should be understood. I do not deny that there
are other important characteristics, apart from sentiency,
which should be valued or conserved. My stress here is
that the special capacity for suffering which we share
with so many nonhuman creatures is theologically
significant if we subscribe to the doctrine of a suffering,
passible God. God may be injured or harmed in creation
in a variety of ways - at least conceivably - but none
more directly than through the infliction of suffering.
In conclusion, you may recall Abelard's reaction to
Thibault's doctrine of divine passibility. "The
Patripassian heresy," he muttered "mechanically." "But,
o God, if it were true.. .It must be. At least, there is
something at the back of it that is true." Then Abelard
went on: "And if we could fmd it - it would bring back
the whole world." At first sight it might seem an
amazingly presumptious claim that the recovery of the
insight of divine passibility could lead to a recovery of
the whole world. And yet is it purely coincidental that
its contrary view, namely the doctrine of divine
impassibility, has triumphed and flourished in Christian

The second objection is that I have effectively
reduced theology to ethics by simply redefining the
essential characteristics of priesthood in ethical tenos.
Some fonos of this objection have my sympathy.
John Zizioulas has recently stressed the limitations of a
response to the ecological crisis which simply places all
its hq>es in ethics. "Whether enforced by State legislation
or taughtor instructed by Churches, academic institutions,
etc., it is ethics that seems to contain the hopes of
humankind in the present situation," he writes. And yet
(he reminds us) "ethics, whether enforced or free,
presupposes other more existential motivations in order
to function.'0J7 It is difficult to deny that Zizioulas is
right here. The appeal to ethics, by itself, is insufficient
Yet it is also very understandable. Forcenturies Christians
have kept our relations with the nonhuman out of the
ethical sphere, and so it is perhaps not altogethersurprising
that their inclusion is now seen as a priority.
However, I am not one of those who think that
salvation lies in ethics alone. Spiritually unenlightened
humanity - especially one that is over-eonfident of its
own humanism - can be a causeof moral darkness. The
approach I have outlined is far from naive ethicism. But
it may be construed as an attack upon what we have had
a surplus ofin the Christian tradition, namely non-ethical
or anti-ethical theology. I suggest that we need a way of
combining the two - theology and ethics - in a much
clearer way than heretofore. Moral theology is a more
acceptable tenn; ascetical ormystical theology even better.
But, at a deeper level, what this objection signifies is
a divorce between divine activity and human response
which is starkly perilous at the present time. The
theological challenge is how we can understand the divine
work of passibility and redemption already operative
within creation through the work ofthe Holy Spirit When
we have such a conception we shall best be able to fully
appreciate the necessity of human response to, indeed,
participation in, that work itself.
The third objection takes us back to my initial thesis
concerning the passibility of God. How can God suffer
eternally and also at the same time offer us liberation
from suffering which is the central hope of the Gospel?
In short If God suffers in creation, how can God also
redeem us from that suffering?
Again, I have no little sympathy for this objection,
which I once held and defended myself. Butthe weakness
of the argument - it now seems to me - is in its view
that God cannot both suffer and redeem that suffering at
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centuries in which theology about the world - and
especially our responsibility for it - seems to have almost
entirely evaporated? It may be that here, as elsewhere,
our doctrine of God has been much more significant for
the salvation of the world than we might have thought
possible. Abelard, I feel sure, would have approved of
the mystical theology contained in these moving lines
from Schweitzer's autobiography: "I could not but feel
with a sympathy full of regret all the pain that I saw
around me, not only that of men, but that of the whole
creation. From this community of suffering I have never
tried to withdraw myself. It seemed to me a matter of
course that we should all take our share of the burden of
suffering which lies upon the world:'38
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